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1. Introduction
The future is unknown. Everything is possible but nothing is 
certain. We live in a world dominated by uncertainty, being confronted 
every day with a spectrum of choices that can influence the future 
into directions often unanticipated. Nothing is more certain than the 
uncertainty prevailing on the consequences of any and every decisions 
and economic activities. Whatever we do in everyday life, any action 
(or inaction) is subject to risk of total or partial failure. This is the very 
nature of economic life in a world where the future remains “the great 
unknown”. At the same time, the risk is - as a general rule - a condition 
for success. In almost all circumstances when we making plans for the 
future we have to choose not between different certainties, but between 
a spectrum of possibilities, which we try to identify and appreciate 
(estimate) in order to assuming and managing risk in some proportion.
Traditionally, economic theory is focused on the behavior, decisions 
and actions of an ideal individual: homo oeconomicus. In summary 
and in a simplified form his basic characteristics are: 
(1) Infinitely sensitive - he is able to identify each and every possible 
alternative;
(2) Fully informed. In a strictly limited sense it means that he knows 
not only what courses of action are possible, but also knows what event 
will occur each time and what are the concrete results for every action. 
Practically it’s a decision under certainty. In an extended approach, it 
supposedly knows only all the alternatives, the consequences of each 
of them and their incidence. So, he is able to calculate (objective) or 
at least to associate (subjective) a probability for each result and to 
determine its impact;
(3) Perfect rationality, which means that he will always choose 
the optimal alternative according to the hedonic principle and be 
consistent in his choices (repeating the same conditions lead to the 
same decision). Homo oeconomicus maximizes its welfare viewed as 
a utility function (as consumer) or profit (as producer) with minimum 
effort. We note that hedonic calculus in utilitarianism theory includes 
as one of the variables the certainty or uncertainty: How likely or 
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unlikely is it that the pleasure will occur? (Bentham, 1789: 29-30). Such 
behavior is predictable, being logical and repeatable. This obviously 
represents an abstracting of the Homo sapiens.
But such assumptions do not generally correspond to the 
reality of the economic life: the real man is not and cannot be fully 
informed; clearly he’s not infinitely sensitive; have limited abilities in 
understanding and analyzing the world; and often behaves irrationally.
However, in majority of the time and for most cases the assumption 
of rationality in decision making remains valid. That is why the 
starting point of our analysis stays a rational individual. Rationality 
is calculative and pragmatic: it aims both to adequacy the means to 
ends and to select those ends according the expected effects.That is 
a subsumption of the instrumental rationality (focused on efficiency) 
and rationality of choices (based on the future values). As far as we 
could determine which means are suitable to achieve a certain goal and 
which are not (within our knowledge) we will be able to estimate the 
chances of achieving a specific target thru the available resources, and 
thus to appreciate on this basis (indirectly) the purpose itself as being 
rational or irrational in practical terms. We can also determine the 
consequences it could have the application of these means in addition 
of reaching the targetted objective, given the interdependence of all 
that happens. In this way we are able to weigh and to compare the 
pursued consequences of his action as well as the unwanted ones. And 
thus getting the answer to the question: What is the “cost” of attaining 
the desired goal in terms of predictable damages to other values? 
(Weber, 1904). A rational goal is the direct consequence of a rational 
behavior and in the same times its proof.
Analysis of the process of decision-making, formulating and 
solving economic decision problems is based on the utility theory as 
well as on the probability theory and statistics. 
Study of the utility in a (partially) uncertain environment reveals 
as specific criterion of choice: the maximization of the expected utility. 
The utility is defined as a function of several parameters, including the 
wealth of the individual (as one of the most important in decisional 
context). 
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The approach on utility in this article is based on the classical analysis 
of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944). We will not insist here on the 
fact that in this analysis the utility is cardinal in some cases (observation 
is required), but on the introduction of the probabilistic point of view 
in the theory of utility: the expected utility hypothesis. We related it to 
more classical expected value paradigm and to certainty equivalent. 
This principle was already been proposed by Daniel Bernoulli 
(1738), which showed that mathematical expectation, the dominant 
theory until then, it is at best a rule of decision in specific situations. 
Expected value does not explain decisions in all circumstance and is not 
applyable in others. Many paradoxes prove it. To justify the rejection 
of the principle of maximizing the expected amount of money, he 
gives an example remained famous in literature: Suppose that a very 
poor fellow somehow obtained a lottery ticket that yield with equal 
probability either nothing or 20,000 ducats. Will this man considered 
unintelligent, non-rational, if he sells the ticket for less than 10,000 
ducats, as much as the expected winnings are? It looks that a pauper 
man would be wise if sell the ticket for 9,000 ducats: he would “lose” 
1,000 ducats from the mathematical expectation of winning, but he 
would avoid in full the risk of losing everything. On the contrary, it 
would seem natural that a rich man to try their luck. All these because 
the determination of the value of an good must be based on the utility 
it yields, and that utility is essentially individual, i.e. dependent on the 
person making the estimate especially on its wealth. Thus there is no 
doubt that the same amount is more significant to a pauper than to a 
rich man (Bernoulli, 1738/1954: 23-24).
A concept of economic utility with sugestion of a marginal aproach 
discussed a century and a half before the marginal utility revolution in 
economic science
Similar idea was prior presented by Cramer in a letter to Nicolas 
Bernoulli (1728): One asks the reason for the difference between the 
mathematical calculation and the common value. I believe that it 
comes from this that the mathematicians value money in proportion 
to its quantity, and men of good sense in proportion to the usage that 
they may make of it (Correspondence…, 2013). 
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For a more extensive and critical retrospect in the history of the 
topic see for example Samuelson (1977), Machina (1987) or Eeckhoudt 
et al. (2005), as well as Malița and zidaroiu (1988).
2. Uncertainty and risk
To understand and analyze the notion of risk, the economic 
literature usually starts from the concept of uncertainty.
Uncertainty is considering a situation where there is a total lack of 
knowledge about the future, there is no available information or the 
information is extremely limited and / or distrust. It will determine 
insecurity about the (highly unknown) future. The source of such 
insecurity could be - as we mentioned - the incomplete or approximate 
knowledge (information) existing at a time, as well as the (objective) 
unpredictable nature of some economic processes.
Future is always open and anything can happen. It refers, therefore, 
to the uncertainty about the expected results from any and from all 
specific economic actions and activities. Having (almost) no precise 
information it is impossible to exactly describe the existing state, all 
possible developments, future outcome, even with a reasonable degree 
of probability. So, an action is considered uncertain when there is more 
than one possible result, without knowing the objective or subjective 
probabilities of occurrence of each of them.
Uncertainty after Knight (1921) appears not only in situations 
where an economic agent cannot objectively assign probabilities of 
various alternatives that may arise due to lack of information, but 
also in situations when it just does not make it. Therefore, in such an 
approach, if it is assigned by decider certain subjective probabilities 
beyond the available data, we deal with risk and not with uncertainty.
Unlike uncertainty, risk is characterized by the possibility to define 
a law of probability for the expected results and economic actors are 
aware of it. From this point of view the risk would be understood as 
“quantifiable” uncertainty.
In real life these two concepts - risk and uncertainty - are found 
combined in different proportions. Existing statistics at a specific 
moment allow the calculation of the probabilities for expected events 
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and to determine on this basis the probability of a certain outcome 
if these events really occur. However uncertainty cannot be removed: 
unpredictable events may cause deviations able to change significantly 
the configuration of statistical data identified in the previous 
observations. The future is not a “rerun”, a repetition (not even at 
another scale) and nor a linear extrapolation of the past. In addition, 
uncertainty becomes a potential source of risk, particularly when we 
are dealing with imperfect information, if the subjective estimations of 
decision-maker are substantially different from objective reality (more 
or less known).
Classically, the concept of economic risks includes at least four 
ideas: (1) an idea of danger or distress - is something you must feared 
about; (2) closely related to the previous idea is the cost - the level of 
this cost expresses the seriousness of the risk; (3) a possible measure 
of the events in terms of probability; (4) finally, an idea of the limited 
danger (failure) as a condition for any future success.
Some observations must be made. First, if the factors act, if the 
events contemplated will occur, it will definitely influence the economic 
results of any activity. Although explicitly it is considered only the 
negative influences, basically in the form of absolute and / or relative 
losses, we mention and the possibility of a win not estimated initially. 
This is explained by the fact that, generally, the factors considered “of 
risk” are mostly general factors influencing the results of economic 
activity, their impact generates a “risk effect” as well as on other hand 
a “gain effect”. Everything depends on direction and intensity of its 
action. And from here the prerequisite of assuming risk as general 
condition for all economic activities. Secondly, such decision must 
be a cost-benefit one. Therefore, important is not only to identify 
the opportunities and the factors acting in each case (including the 
probability of their occurrence), but the intensity with which they can 
act, the expected impact. So not simply identifying the consequences, 
but also estimating the size of these effects, their “costs”. Such a 
precise determination - except in very limited categories or specific 
conditions - it is extremely difficult if not impossible. Approximations 
could be needed as well as highly limitative assumptions to define 
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subjective estimations, and their determination based on such relative 
approach involves important risks itself. Thirdly, it is worth noting the 
association between risk and action taken or inaction. Any action is - 
as we have seen - basically uncertain about its full results and therefore 
risky. But economically the inaction can be and is generating risks too 
(of loss) - especially related to economic valorization of the property. 
The wealth preservation (as a minimum economic rational target) 
involves engaging in specific actions and taking risks appreciated as 
lower than those involved by reducing the value due to its non-use. 
Finally, the risk is not exclusively related to the occurrence of losses. It 
also related to the possibility that the expected gain will be lower, that 
objectives are achieve only in part or with higher costs. There are also 
damages, as difference between the expected outcomes and the real 
ones (not in absolute terms but into a relative measurement).
Trying an overview of the concept of economic risk, we may 
highlight some general features such as: 
(1) The risk is related to the total or partial lack of information 
(knowledge), mainly due to the uncertainty over the future;
(2) The presence of certain disturbing factors, known or unknown 
(in some limits), predictable (objectively) or not, measurable or at 
least estimable (even subjectively);
(3) The possibility that these factors (or some of them) will 
influence the future in a specific direction and to produce certain 
effects (in particular, risk considers only those directions which may 
lead to negative consequences);
(4) If such a factor act with an significantly under or significantly 
above mean intensity (or to the expected intensity), will definitely 
cause changes in the initial estimated conditions and will influence the 
outcomes of the economic activity (e.g. total or partial failure to attend 
designed objectives - if we took into consideration the negative impacts);
(5) It produced effects on the welfare, on the assets, for which the 
injured part can not hold accountable anyone in particular;
(6) Affect in various forms and intensity both individuals and 
economic activities of any kind, being a permanence in the economic 
and social life.
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In synthesis we can define the economic risk as the possibility 
(probabilistic estimated) that a factor (or multiples), known and 
unknown (both partially), more or less predictable, controllable or 
not, will manifest in the future in a way that might lead to negative 
consequences for the economic activity and/or outcomes on individual 
level or to the entire economy.
3. Some considerations on decisions 
 under uncertainty and risk
A decision problem consists essentially in selecting an alternative 
that is in some sense the “best”. If there are certainty over consequences 
arising from the adoption of an alternative or another, selecting the 
best decision does not pose problems (Malița and zidaroiu, 1980: 10). 
But if we do not know the events that will take place the problem 
became complicated.
Making a decision requires consideration to multiple elements, 
mainly related to risk and uncertainty. Although there are analytical 
tools, methods and techniques more or less complex supporting 
the decision-maker in the decision process, the very decision itself 
involves some risk (“decision-making risks”), and not only assuming 
the risks. A good decision, the correct one can be invalidated by future 
developments in economic activity. The decision itself cannot be 
questioned, it fairness remains valid, but the conclusion that follows 
from this is that: the right decisions cannot and does not eliminate risks; 
it only reduces the possibility of their occurrence or the consequences 
of their manifestation.
We emphasize that there must be a clear distinction between “good 
decisions” and “good consequences.” In ordinary language, a decision is 
consider being a good one if (and only if!) it conducts to a positive result. 
Such approach will be valid only in certainty conditions. Otherwise, 
the difficulty is that no one knows for sure which decision lead to what 
specific result and cannot choose such a proper decision since the 
consequences are arising from a higher or lower uncertainty. But this is 
not the significance of “good” decision in economic theory. Under this 
theory, a decision is considered “good” or “correct” if it was taken on 
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the basis of proper judgments, if so is consistent with assessments on 
uncertainty and preferences over estimated consequences. Obviously, 
there may be some good decisions having “bad” consequences. The 
chances of occurrence of negative consequences are generally lower 
when we deal with a rational scientific decision, but the possibility of 
such consequences is not excluded in any circumstances (Malița and 
zidaroiu, 1980: 25).
Modern decision theory - as it was developed especially in the 
economic field - defines three categories of decision:
(1) Decisions under certainty conditions, in which case it is known 
the precise outcome in every situation (for each alternative we will 
have a unique result);
(2) Decisions under risk, in which case it is neccessary to identify 
each and every possible event, and to set a probability of occurrence. 
Thus, for each alternative and for every associated event the rate of risk 
is determined (objectively estimated on the basis of the statistically 
observed frequencies);
(3) Decisions under uncertainty, in which case we may know (more 
or less) the results for each alternative and / or possible event, but 
there frequencies are not known or cannot be estimated. Hence the 
level of risk is unknown even probabilistic.
Distinction between risk and uncertainty is consistent with Knight 
(1921). The decision rules depend on the nature of the above described 
situations. Under certainty selecting the best alternative is simply 
consist in ordering the corresponding results according to a preference 
criterion - mainly maximum effects or minimum efforts (multicriteria 
methods was also developed). If we consider maximizing the utility, 
the optimal alternative will be the one that has the highest utility 
(U), i.e.: U = max (Ui ). In a situation of uncertainty, by not knowing 
the probabilities of occurrence of the various events and by not 
being possible to determine the consequences, the meaning of “most 
preferred” (optimum) is not clear. Without insisting on the subject, we 
only mention that there are a set of rules or decision criteria applying 
in this cases, such as: the Wald’s maximin criterion (pessimistic 
perspective of a conservative decision maker) or the Savage minimax 
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regrets criterion (opportunity loss), the maximax criterion (overly 
superoptimistic and aggresive decision maker), the Hurwicz rule or 
the (Bayes) Laplace insufficient reason criterion.
Under risk the optimal alternative will be the one having the 
highest expected utility. The decisional context could be summarizing 
by the below scheme:
E1 E2 ... En
p1 p2 ... pn
V1 u11 u12 ... u1n
V2 u21 u22 ... u2n
...................
Vi ui1 ui2 ... uin
where: Vi = a specific identified alternative i; En = an possible event 
n (state of nature); pn = probability of occurrence of the event En; 
uin = utility associated (to outcomes wi) with the alternative Vi if and 
only if the specific event En took place.
The objective function to maximize in this case will have the form:
UVi(W) = Σpn·uin
A utility function with the expected utility form is called a von 
Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility function (EU). In a simplified 
form for two alternatives the function became: 
EU(W) = p·U(w-) + (1-p)·U(w+)
where U(w-) and U(w+) are the utility of the wealth level w-, respectively 
w+. Obvious p·U(w-) and (1-p)·U(w+) represents the expected utility of 
the wealth level w-, respectively w+. 
The utility will be regarded as a measure unit for the 
multidimensional result of the set of possible alternatives and their 
contribution to the pursued objectives, understood as possible and 
probable consequences (positive or negative). We assume that the 
utility is a monotone and increasing function of wealth (W), i.e. 
there is no satiety, and marginal utility is always positive, but it can 
be increasing, decreasing or constant. Each of these three cases will 
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correspond to a certain identifiable attitude towards risk: aversion, 
seeking (loving) or neutral. 
The curvature of the utility function U(W) offers direct informations 
on the attitudes to risk (see Figure 1). Arrow (1965) and Pratt (1964) 
use the curvature index (–U″(w)/U′(w)) as a (absolute) measure unit 
for risk (ARA). The concavity degree will also vary with wealth. 
For a risk-averse (or risk avoid) person the utility function (U-
(W)) is increasing with wealth, but with a decreasing ratio. Marginal 
utility of wealth is always positive (U′(w)>0), but it decreases with 
the wealth, so the utility function is concave (ARA>0). The utility of 
the present level of wealth or the utility of the expected value U(EV) 
is superior to the expected utility EU(W). In his opinion there is no 
real opportunity. This represents a typical behavior and is related to 
economic rationality. More, that is a characteristic of people in general.
U(EV) > EU(W) with U′(w)>0, U″(w)>0
U[p∙w-+(1-p)∙w+] > p∙U(w-)+(1-p)∙U(w+)
Figure 1. The utility function’s form 
for different risk attitude
 
 
U=(W) 
w- w+ w W 
U(w) 
 U+(W) 
U-(W) 
(EV) 
U+(EV) 
U-(EV) 
EU(W)=U=(EV) 
U(w-k) 
U(w+k) 
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Besides the typical case of risk aversion, there are - as already 
noted - yet two situations appreciated if not as exceptions at least as 
much rare cases.
If there are preference for risk, the utility function is convex 
(ARA<0), which implies that the marginal utility of wealth is not only 
positive, but increasing with the level of wealth. In such a case, the 
risk-seeking persons are willing to “risk” superior amount of money 
comparative to mathematical equivalent (certain) of winning. For 
them the expected utility is higher than utility associated with the 
expected wealth U(EV). Although this attitude doesn’t derive from 
a typical human behavior (so neither economic), it does not mean 
that such decidents will lose for sure. Also, it not to be confused with 
addiction to risk, it does not mean to ignore the risk in full (choose 
to ignore any contingency plan) but only to accepte it more easily.
The form of the utility function in this case is shown in the Figure 1 
as U+(W).
U(EV) < EU(W) with U′(w)>0, U″(w)<0
U[p∙w-+(1-p)∙w+] < p∙U(w-)+(1-p)∙U(w+)
The utility function is linear in the case of risk-neutral (U=(W)) and 
the marginal utility evolving strictly proportional to the wealth. Those 
who have such an attitude will be willing to risk the exact amount of 
the mathematical equivalent of winning. Expected utility is equal in 
their assessing to the utility of wealth associated to certain equivalent 
or to initial condition U(EV).
U(EV) = EU(W) with U′(w)>0, U″(w)=0
U[p∙w-+(1-p)∙w+] = p∙U(w-)+(1-p)∙U(w+)
Prudence (mainly related to savings behavior) and temperance 
are other concept related to risk attitude (behind risk aversion) 
developed by economic literature. Intensity and direction of reaction 
are important elements based on the interpretation of higher order 
derivates of utility function U(w) such as (-U(n)(w)/U(n-1)(w)). A 
generalization of ARA. Prudence is characterize by an utility function 
with U″′(w)>0 and its strength measured by an absolute coefficient 
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defined as -U″′(w)/U″(w). A coefficient of the form -U(4)(w)/U″′(w) 
measures the asolute temperance (Eeckhoudt, 2012).
The sets of preferences presented above are usually enough to 
explain decisions. Such behaviors are consistent for each individual 
with the same decisional categories and not necessarily at general level 
and for all its decisions. 
4. Comments on the rationality of choices 
 from a theoretically economic perspective
That doesn’t mean that a risk-averse person will never accept risk, 
or a risk-seeking person will assume the risk in any circumstance. It 
simply means that the terms which convince one or another to enter 
in the game are different. And such terms relate basically to the level 
of the expected outcomes and of the estimated odds. Of course in 
this context the personality has a role in the attitude to risk, but from 
psychological aspects we will retain for now only the generally accepted 
idea that people prefer more not to lose rather than to win. Sure, some 
differences are identified here too, e.g. prevention-focused people vs. 
promotion-focused people (Grant and Higgins, 2013 - and all related 
to regulatory focus theory) which obviously conduct to a more or less 
propensity to risk-taking.
“The dollar I win is not as worthwhile to me as the dollar I lose, 
and that is why I will shun a bet at ‘fair’ odds (and, of course, at 
‘unfair’ odds)” (Samuelson, 1977: 25). What fair odds means? Are 
they understood only in terms of probability or in the level of expected 
gains as well? We try to present in the following a direction to answer 
it from an economic perspective. If the expected theory integrated the 
probabilities with outcomes and their utilities, and partially solved the 
problem, the remaining issue is to appreciate the (minimum) amount 
of money considered sufficient for a decider to accept the risk (e.g. a 
game or a investition). 
In our opinion a minimum of variables influencing the required 
gain are: the initial level of wealth (w), the maximum possible loss (k) 
and the probability of its occurrence (p). The wealth level determines 
in the majority of the situations the attitude to risk as well as the 
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marginal utility of money. Traditionally, a lower level of wealth is 
related to a more risk-averse reaction. The risk-aversion decreasing 
directly to an increment of the wealth and at some point may conduct 
to a risk-seeking attitude. On the other hand, the same sum of money 
(a possible gain or loss) has different utility according to the individual 
wealth and in the same time it must be economically seen in a relative 
manner as a part or quota of the fortune (how much a loss diminished 
the current wealth). Lower probabilities of winning are not wanted by 
anybody, but what is a lower probability remain a subjective approach 
(also related to wealth). More than its absolute level what appears 
to be significant is the ratio between the probability to lose and the 
probability of winning. 
If we limit our analysis to a simple situation of 2 possible 
alternatives: win or loss (with associated probabilities p and 1-p), 
several discussions must be made:
(1) If we presume equal chances to win or lose (e.g. p = 1 - p = ½) 
the same amount of money k (k>0), it is clear that:
>
−
k k
w k w
where (w-k) is the weakened welfare if risks of lose are materialized.
Economically the yield is higher for an increase of wealth from 
(w - k) to w in comparation with an increase from w to (w+k). That 
means the potential loss is perceived as higher in relative terms to 
potential winnings. In this respect the amount of gain is considered to 
be not enough to action. 
(2) To determine in that case the minimum acceptable gain (θk) 
we must assume at least equal yields for both events: 
k k
w k w
θ
=
−
, and 
from here we have: 
w
w k
θ =
−
That is exactly the ratio between the current level of wealth and 
a weakened level of wealth resulted from failure. It depends both 
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on wealth (w) and maximum possible loss (k). For risk-taking the 
expected level of gain should exceed possible level of loss by θ times, 
which in this case is:
w
k k
w k
θ =
−
That should be the leverage determining a positive response from 
decision-makers to accept the risk. It transforms a risk-averse decider 
to a risk-neutral one. Economically it corresponds to the minimum 
requirements for risk acceptance. The level is not constant, obviously 
higher levels of wealth (w → ∞ with k presumed fixed, conduct to 
w-k → ∞) determined the decreasing of θ (θ → 1). So, rich people seem 
to accept lower returns for the same possible losses to accept the same 
risks. On the other hand rich people are willing to risk larger amount 
of money for the same expected rate of returns (if θ=ct. and w → ∞, 
than k → ∞).
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) state that for even chances to win 
and lose, a prospect will only be acceptable if the gain is at least twice 
as large as the loss. Geller (2013) appreciates that as correct in normal 
situations (under a normal level of money anxiety). During times of 
high money anxiety people are more risk averse and therefore they 
take the chance of loosing only if the expected winning are four time 
higher (such as during and in the aftermath of the Great Reccesion in 
USA). When there are times of very low money anxiety people became 
willing to take a chance of winning or loosing the same amount.
(3) Finally if we extend the previous assumptions to uneven 
probabilities (p ≠ 1-p ≠ ½), the expected value became: 
EV = (w + θk) – (1+θ)pk
Applying previous risk-neutral transformation (so EU(W) = U(EV)) 
and considering as a minimum acceptable also the equal yields, but now 
in the form of: 
p k ( 1 p) k
w k w
θ⋅ − ⋅
=
−
, we determine the θ as:
p w
1 p w k
θ = ⋅
− −
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And θk 
p w
k k
1 p w k
θ = ⋅
− −
So, in addition to the ratio between current and diminished wealth 
(outlined above w w k− ), the minimum amount of acceptable gain is 
proportionally multiply by the ratio between the probability of loss 
and the probability of winning ( p 1 p− ). Lower chances of success will 
increase caeteris paribus the minimum acceptable level of gains. All 
other comments on wealth and risked amount of money remain valid.
5. Final remarks
A precise and generally applicable form of the utility function 
could not be determined. It was assumed that the function is concave 
for low levels of wealth (income) and gradually became convex at 
higher levels of wealth (income). Economic agents, as well as common 
people would be more willing to risk as their wealth (income) is larger. 
This hypothesis could not be verified beyond any controversy. In their 
famous article, Friedman and Savage (1948) showed how a utility 
function which was concave at low wealth levels and convex at high 
wealth levels could explain the behavior of individuals who both incur 
risk by purchasing lottery tickets as well as avoid risk by purchasing 
insurance.
Another problem is related to a relative contradictory behavior in 
some situations. If we analyzes the effects of changes in uncertainty 
over the economic decision, especially at individual level, we may 
confront with opposite possible reactions: a risk-averse person could 
saves more in order to ensure minimum resources for the future or 
could spent more because of the higher uncertainty of the returns 
(Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1971).
That instability could be explained by the characteristics of 
human nature rather than cold mathematical expectations, such as 
spontaneous optimistic (or pessimistic) waves. Reasonable individual 
calculations appear to be supplemented by the “animal spirit”, by an 
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urge to action (Keynes, 1936). Action in a specific direction, selected 
as a result of a decisional process and not randomly. Reasonable 
calculation presumes limited information properly analyzed (according 
to individuals limited abilities) in an uncertainty background.
We could follow a developing line from the classically rational 
homo oeconomicus to the limited rationality of behavioral economics. 
In psychology, decision-making is regarded as a cognitive process 
aimed to identify the most probable alternatives according to his beliefs 
and knowledge and to select a particular one based on its own values 
and preferences. Risk attitudes are usually adopted subconsciously, 
the exception being when the person or group involved consciously 
decides to over-ride their automatic response because they want 
to understand the situation more clearly, and make an appropriate 
rather than automatic choice (Hillson and Murray-Webster, 2007). 
This is the case with economic decisions. Especially when we 
consider professionals decision makers (technocrats). The spectrum 
of risk attitude as response to uncertainty and in direct relation with 
comfort/discomfort level is very similar. Excluding the extreme cases 
of risk-paranoid and risk-addicted, the general human attitude from 
psychological perspective includes: risk-averse, risk tolerant and risk-
seeking. There are some particularities in learning to and in accept 
risk (especially for risk-tolerant) as well as differences in boundaries 
(especially for risk-neutral).
The ambition of decision theory was to quantify the uncertainty 
and preferences for consequences in all situations; but for many real 
complex situations this ambition is unrealistic (Malița and zidaroiu, 
1980: 31).
The difficulties we encounter are numerous. For example in 
encoding information as probabilities. The available information may 
vary from a strong conviction, resulting from long run observations 
and experiences, to a vague opinion formed just by few observations. 
However, in practice there is generally no cases where the information 
is totally absent (so there is no such thing as “absolute or perfect 
uncertainty”), as well as there is no perfect information (i.e. “absolute 
certainty”). Although initially someone “has no idea” what will happen 
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in the future, if the outcomes that may follow are important for the 
individual, we appreciate him will end up by expressing its state of 
knowledge through assessing the probability required. Even the 
smallest subjective estimation moves us in the area of analysis in terms 
of risk (from the “un-measurable” Knightian uncertainty or ambiguity, 
to a risk approximation highly sensitive to the assumptions made). 
Let’s note that any objectively determined probabilities are not 
absolute certainty (even if are usually considered as facts), because 
they measure the level of our knowledge of the reality and not the 
actual condition (Malița and zidaroiu, 1980: 51).
In many cases aspects and variables that are not easily quantifiable 
were left outside the discussion. But constructing a comprehensive list 
(as complete as possible) of the uncertain events is one of the main 
conditions for a proper analysis. There are numerous examples that 
demonstrate the catastrophic consequences that may have the ignoring 
of a single one.
We must add that the theory of decision under risk (and 
uncertainty) is a normative theory: it shows how to act consistent to a 
rational behavior, in a coherent manner with the decider preferences 
on the future events and the expected consequences.
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